Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications
2005

Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose
Jonathan H. Adler
Case Western University School of Law, jonathan.adler@case.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Repository Citation
Adler, Jonathan H., "Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose" (2005). Faculty
Publications. 174.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/174

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

IS MORRISON DEAD?
ASSESSING A SUPREME DRUG (LAW) OVERDOSE
by
Jonathan H. Adle/
Drugs would destroy the bravest and craziest ofthe rock stars.
_ Stephen Davis I
Dnlg prohibition does violence to the Constitution.
2
- David Boaz
There was little doubt that the federal government would prevail in
Gonzales v. Raich. What was, perhaps, so unexpected was so expansive a
repudiation of enforceable judicial limitations on federal power. In
upholding the constitutionality of the Controlled Substances Act as
applied to the non-commercial intrastate possession and consumption of
marijuana for medical purposes as authorized under California law, the
Supreme Court hollowed out the core ofcontemporary Commerce Clause
juri:,prudence. Insofar as United States v. Morrison had stood for the
prapositions that only intrastate economic activities could be aggregated
for purposes of the "substantial affects" test, that attenuated connections
between a regulatory scheme and interstate commerce exceeded
Congress's limited and enumerated powers, and, perhaps most
importantly, that judicial review should serve as the ultimate check on
overly broad assertions offederal power, it may now be a dead letter.
The rationale adopted by Justice Stevens's majority opinion undercuts
the primary judicial safeguards offederalism. While the Raich majority
purports to be {ollowing the doctrinal contours of Lopez and Morrison, it
actually represents a repudiation of these prior cases. Further, Raich
continued the Supreme Court's uninterrupted practice of rejecting as
applied challenges to federal statutes, and is likely to preclude any such
suits in thefuture. The inability to mount as-applied challenges to broad
regulatory statutes like the CSA is significant because it creates
additional barriers to fillure Commerce Clause litigation. The lack of a
viable way to challenge discrete applications of broader federal laws
means few Commerce Clause challenges can ever hope to succeed. The
• Visiting Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law; Associate
Professor and Associate Director, Center for Business Law & Regulation, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law. The author would like to thank Nelson Lund, Andrew
Morriss, Christina Rorick, and Nathaniel Stewart for the comments on earlier drafts of this
Article. Any errors, omissions, irrelevancies, or inanities are solely the fault of the author.
I STEPHEN DAVIS, 11M MORRISON: LIFE, DEATH, LEGEND xii (Gotham Books 2004).
2 David Boaz, Drug Prohibition Has Failed, Cato Institute, Mar. 3, 1997, available at
http: //www.cato.org/dailys/3-03-97.html .
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central holding of Morrison, like the legendary Jim Morrison, nnw lives
on only in the hearts oftrue believers.

1.

THE SOFT PARADE ................................................................................ 754
BREAK ON THROUGH (TO THE OTHER SIDE) ............ .. ................... 759
LIGHT MY FIRE ..... ........ ... ......................................... .... ..... .................... 762
A. Five to One ... ... ......... ............. ... .......... ........ .......... ..... ..... ..... .............. 766
B. The Changeling ..... ... .. ........ ............... ................. .... .. .......... ............... 768
I CAN'T SEE YOUR FACE ........................... ....... .. ................................. 770
WHEN THE MUSIC'S OVER ........ ........................... ... ..... .. ............ .. ...... 776

II.
III.

TV.
V.

All eyes were on Jim Morrison when The Doors took the stage. Audiences
never knew quite what to expect, but there was never much doubt that it would
be a night to remember. He could leave an entire concert hall in spellbound
awe, or storm off in a substance-induced rage. One night he could be the
world's most impressive and influential rock musician- sought out by Mick
3
Jagger for advice on how to perform on stage. Another he could be a virtual
sociopath, assaulting audiences with invective, spurring riots, and getting
4
himself arrested for allegedly obscene conduct. Audiences could not know in
advance whether they would see the rock legend who inspired millions, or the
twenty-something has-been who would later die of a drug overdose. Yet at
every Doors show, one thing was for certain: It would not be forgotten. s
During the Supreme Court's October 2004 term, all eyes were on
Gonzales v. Raich. 6 While there was never much doubt about the outcome
few expected Angel Raich and the other respondents to prevail- legal
commentators did not know quite what to expect. The Chief Justice could pen a
narrow opinion for the Court, rejecting Raich' s claim by distinguishing the
regulation of commodities from other expansive exercises of federal power,
thereby preserving the essential holdings of United States v. Lopez7 and (more
importantly) United States v. Morrison. 8 The Chief had safeguarded federalism
before, he could do it again. 9 Or Justice Stevens, the ranking dissenter from the

) See DAVIS, supra note I, at 263~64.
Most infamously, Miami police filed a warrant for Morrison's arrest after a March
1969 show at which he allegedly exposed his genitals to the audience. J:yewitnesses deny the
police account, but it generated notations in Morrison's FBI file nonetheless. See DAVIS,
supra note I, at 319~21 , 322~23. One Morrison biographer would describe the subsequent
trial as a politically motivated "kangaroo court." Id. at 383. This was not Morrison' s only
brush with the law. At another show in New Haven, Morrison was arrested for obscenity
after launching into a tirade about how he had been maced by a police officer before the
show while he was "getting acquainted" with a local college student. /d. at 214-16.
5 Indeed, it is a testament to the memorability of Morrison's performances that a recent
biography was able to detail well over one-hundred performances by The Doors in the
band's very short musical career. See generally D AV IS , supra note 1.
6 125 S. Ct. 2 I 95 (2005).
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
8 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
9 See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 118 (2000) (upholding the Driver's Privacy Prolection
4
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Rehnquist Court's "New Federalism" could collect five votes to free federal
power from judicial restraints. In recent terms, the "federalist five" had shown
1o
itself to be a less stable court majority than some had hoped or feared. One
thing was certain, Raich would be an important federalism case.
That the federal government would prevail did not necessari Iy mean that a
pillar of the "New Federalism" would suffer a mortal blow in the process. Yet
that appears to be the outcome in Raich. In upholding the constitutionality of
the Controlled Substances Act as-applied to the non-commercial intrastate
possession and consumption of marijuana for medical purposes as authorized
under California law, the Supreme Court hollowed out the core of
contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Insofar as Morrison stood for
the propositions that only intrastate economic activities could be aggregated for
purposes of the "substantial affects" test, that attenuated connections between a
regulatory scheme and interstate commerce exceeded Congress's limited and
enumerated powers, and, perhaps most importantly, that judicial review should
serve as the ultimate check on overly broad assertions of federal power, it is no
more. For this-killing Morrison- it is unlikely Raich will be forgotten.
Part I of this Article opens with the soft parade of United States v. Lopez, a
tentative and meager start to the reinvigoration of enumerated powers. While
Lopez is seen as the foundational modern Commerce Clause case, Part II
suggests it was United States v. Morrison that represented the rea) breakthrough
for the "New Federalism." Far more than Lopez, Morrison suggested that the
judicial safeguards of federalism II were real and would be enforced, even in the
12
context of enumerated powers. It highlighted the distinction of economic and
non-economic activity for Commerce Clause analysis and stressed the need for
some judicially enforceable limit on federal power.
Part III turns to the Raich decision, delineating how the rationale adopted
by Justice Stevens's majority opinion undercuts the primary judicial safeguards
of federalism solidified by Morrison . While the Raich majority purports to be
following the doctrinal contours of Lopez and Morrison, it actually represents a
repudiation of these prior cases. Part III also considers some of the other
opinions that were (and were not) written to justify the Court's result. Justice
Scalia's opinion concurring in the judgment is no less expansive than Justice
Stevens's majority, and is equally lethal to Morrison's central holding . Justice
Kennedy, on the other hand, concurred with the majority opinion without

Act as a proper exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power).
10 Recent federalism cases in which the five most conservative justices failed to vote
together include: Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S . 509 (2004) (upholding abrogation of state
sovereign immunity under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Alaska Dep't of
Envtl. Cons. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U.S. 461 (2004) (upholding federal preemption of
state permitting decision); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003)
(upholding abrogation of sovereign immunity under the Family and Medical Leave Act).
II See generally John C. Y 00, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L
REv. 1311 (1997) (arguing that "judicial safeguards" of federalism replaced "political
safeguards" in the Rehnquist Court).
12 Cf ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 17 (2001) ("the
idea of limited national power is not judicially enforceable").
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explanation. Given his outspoken defenses of federalism in the past, this silence
is quite conspicuous, as it appears he has changed his views on the judicial
safeguards of federalism.
Part IV discusses the particular difficulties posed by as-applied Commerce
Clause challenges. Both Lopez and Morrison had been facial challenges to
federal statutes. No as-applied Commerce Clause challenge has prevailed in the
Supreme Court since the New Deal. Raich continued the Supreme Court's
uninterrupted practice of rejecting such challenges to federal statutes, and is
likely to preclude any such suits in the future . The inability to mount as-applied
challenges to broad regulatory statutes like the Controlled Substances Act is
significant because it creates additional barriers to future Commerce Clause
litigation. All but the most aggressive believers in a "New Federalist"
jurisprudence would hesitate before nullifying wide swaths of the federal code.
The lack of a viable way to challenge discrete applications of broader federal
laws means few Commerce Clause challenges can ever hope to succeed. The
Article concludes by considering whether Morrison ' s central holding, like Jim
Morrison himself, lives on only in the hearts of true believers. For those who
believe in Morrison's message, the outlook is grim.
I.

THE SOFT PARADE

l3

The Supreme Court's decision invalidating the Gun-Free School Zone Act
l4
(GFSZA) in United States v. Lopez was quite unexpected. The Court had not
struck down a federal statute for exceeding the scope of the Commerce Clause
in over one-half century. After the New Deal revolution, the idea that there
were justiciable limits on the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power
was a dead letter. 15 As then-Justice William Rehnquist observed in 1981 , "one
could easily get the sense from this Court' s opinions that the federal system
exists only at the sufferance of Congress.,,16 Indeed, the reigning legal doctrine
relied upon "political safeguards," rather than judicial review, to ;rotect state
autonomy and enforce constitutional limitations on federal power. I

THE DOORS, The Soft Parade, on THE SOFT PARADE (ElektraJAsylum Records 1969).
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
15 See, e.g. , BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE-VOL. I: FOUNDATIONS 105 (1991)
(noting that after the New Deal "[a] commitment to federalism . . . was no longer thought to
require a constitutional strategy that restrained the national government to a limited number
of enumerated powers over economic and social life").
16 Hodel v. Va . Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 308 (1981)
(Rehnquist, 1., concurring). For the same reason, Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski
characterized the Commerce Clause as the "Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like
Clause." Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARv. lL. & PUB. POL'y 1, 5
(1995).
17 See, e.g., Garcia v. Sail Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
The political safeguards theol)' upon which Garcia relied is outlined in Herbert Wechsler,
The Political Safeguards ofFederalism: The Role ofStates in th e Composition and Selection
of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954). See also JESSE H. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); Jesse H. Choper, The
Scope of National Power Vis-a-vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86
13

14
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The revival of judicially enforceable limits on federal power prompted
strong reaction as commentators greeted, or condenmed, the Court for a
potentially radical shift in federalism jurisprudence. Professor Laurence Tribe
commented that Lopez, in conjunction with other federalism decisions, brought
the Court "close" to "somethin~ radically different from the modem
understanding of the Constitution." The New York Times' Linda Greenhouse
warned Lopez "put in play . .. fundamental questions about the essential nature
of the Federal Government,,1 9
2o
Despite the strong reaction, Lopez was a particularly modest opinion.
While starting at "first principles" with an assertion of limited and enumerated
powers, Chief Justice RehnRuist's majority opinion was quite tentative and
2
embraced a narrow holding. The Court eschewed any "precise formulation"
22
that would create a bright-line limitation on federal power. The Court instead
stressed that there had to be some limit on federal power, but never made clear
23
what that limit entailed. It rejected the federal government ' s arguments for
sustaining the GFSZA because such arguments would create a commerce
power without limit-in effect a federal police power-but it did not identifY
how limited the commerce power should be.
Under Lopez, the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate in
three areas: 1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; 2) the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce; and 3) those activities that "substantially affect" interstate
commerce?4 The first two categories are rather unambiguous. If an item is used
or sold in interstate commerce, it may be regulated, as may the channels
through which such items flow. The contours of the "substantial effects" test,
on the other hand, are less obvious-and subject to the greatest dispute.
As described in Lopez-and subsequently elaborated upon in Morrison
the "substantial effects" test is more qualitative than quantitative. It is more

YALE L.J. 1552 (1977). While Garcia was not a Commerce Clause case, the political
safeguards theory it articulated has been advanced in the Commerce Clause context.
18 Quoted in Linda Greenhouse, Focus on Federal Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1995,
at AI.
19 Linda Greenhouse, Focus on Federal Power, N .Y. TIMES, May 24, 1995, at AI .
20 In particular, Lopez stopped far short of an originalist conception of the Commerce
Clause. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also
Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REv.
847 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning ofthe Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 101 (200 I); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L.
REv. 1387 (1987) .
21 Lopez, 514 U .S. at 552, " After its ringing opening, the majority opinion quickly
retreats from a robust, principled theory of enumerated powers." MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL
FEDERALISM : WHY IT MATTERS, How IT COULD HAPPEN 27 (1999).
22 Lopez, 514 U .S. at 567 ("These are not precise formulations ...").
23 GREVE, supra note 21, at 28 ("The observation that there has to be some limit to
congressional power and some distinction between commercial and noncommercial
activities leads back to the questions of where that limit and distinction might be found, and
Lopez provides no clear answer.").
24 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558- 59.
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concerned with the nature of the regulated activity or the regulatory scheme in
question than with the aggregate economic impact of the regulated activity
alone, or in combination with other similarly regulated activities. Summarizing
prior precedent, the Court detected a "clear" pattern: "Where economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity
will be sustained.,,25 The activity regulated by the GFSZA- possessing a gun in
a school zone-"by its terms ha[d] nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort
of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.,,26
Therefore, it did not "substantially affect" commerce, even if aggregated with
all other instances of like conduct. As the majority observed, under such
reasoning "Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities
that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to
interstate commerce.',27 If the only question is whether a particular class of
activities impacts interstate economic activity in some identifiable way, there is
hardly anything that falls outside of Congress's authority. And that is the whole
point of the Lopez test-to reassert the existence of some limit on federal
power, even if the limit itself remained undefined.
The initial doctrinal import of Lopez was further softened by Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion, joined by Justice O'Connor, that "counsel[ed]
great restraint" before enforcing Commerce Clause limits.28 The concurrence
strongly indicated that the two swing justices were not entirely on board with
the majority's reinvigoration of the judicial safeguards of federalism, even in a
modest formulation . The Lopez holding was "necessary though limited,,29 and
the interest of preserving a federal-state balance would have to be weighed
against the nation's "immense stake in the stability of [the Court's] Commerce
Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point.,,3o While the Court would
intervene where Congress clearly overstepped its bounds, Justice Kennedy
emphasized that the ultimate check on federal power had to come from the
3l
political branches themselves.
The majority placed greatest emphasis on the Commerce Clause itself, and
whether a regulated activity could be said to "substantially affect" interstate
commerce. Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, stressed the need to safeguard
"areas of traditional state concern." In this formulation, judicial review is more
appropriate to prevent federal intrusion into territory historically the province
of the states than it is to enforce any textual limit on the federal government's

ld. at 560.
!d.
27 Ed. at 564.
2 8 ld. at 568 (Kennedy, J. , concurring).
29 ld.
30 ld. at 574.
31 ld. at 577. Thus, while Kennedy rejected a "complete renunciation of the judicial
role" (emphasis added) he also stressed : "[I.]t would be mistaken and mischievous for the
political branches to forget that the sworn obligation to preserve and protect the Constitution
in maintaining the federal balance is their own in the first and primary instance." Ed. at 578,
577.
25
26
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enumerated POWe:fS. As Justice Kennedy warned, "Were the Federal
Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state
concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial
activities , the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority
would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.,,32 As he
presented it, this distinction between "state" and "federal" was not particularly
coherent. Without reference to the textual division of governmental power, or
some exogenous theory of subsidiarity within a federal republic, there is no
clear basis for assuming a given matter is more a state or federal concern, and
Justice Kennedy never provided such a theory.
One reason in particular to safeguard state policy prerogatives is to ensure
that states may operate as laboratories of democracy trying "novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."n It also enables
34
states to develop policies that match local needs, preferences, and advantages.
Justice Kennedy noted it was "well established that education is a traditional
concern of the States," and over forty states already outlawed gun possession in
35
school to some degree. Insofar as gun possession in school zones was a
problem, states were on the case, and undue federal intervention could only
serve to impede the process by cutting states off from the costs and benefits of
their own policy decisions. The GFSZA "foreclose[d] the States from
experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay
claim by right of history and expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity
beyond the realm of commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of that term.,,36
While Kennedy's opinion stressed the need for state experimentation, there
does not seem to be much risk of state experimentation in the Lopez context
because states are unlikely to compete by doing less to control crime--in other
words, in the criminal law context, allowing for state experimentation is
unlikely to produce much actual interjurisdictional competition of the sort that
37
might justify intervention. For this rationale to have teeth, it would have to
apply where state policy diversity would be less certain to yield uniformly
38
"positive" results. Laboratories are not free to experiment if they are not free
to fail.
If Lopez marked the start of an enumerated powers parade, it was a soft
parade. Without challenging the vitality of prior precedent, the Court merely

ld. at 577 (Kennedy, 1., concurring).
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, If its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country. ").
34 See generally Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders '
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484 (J 987).
35 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580- 81 (Kennedy, 1., concurring).
36 ld. at 583 .
37 See Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 167,180 (1996).
38 GREVE, supra note 21, at 82.
32
33
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"decline[d] here to proceed any further.,,39 That a given activity sufficiently
affected commerce to be subject to federal regulation would no longer be
accepted solely on Congress's say so. The Court would make its own
independent, if still deferential, assessment. Rehnquist's majority opinion
sought to integrate Lopez into the Court's prior precedents, noting that prior
opinions repeatedly acknowledged that the commerce power was limited in
scope and stressing that even the most expansive of the prior precedents
remained good law. It failed to challenge any of the existing post-New Deal
precedents, preferring instead to reconcile them by distinguishing, and perhaps
somewhat redefining them. As Michael Greve observed, Lopez did not
"revive[] the enumerated powers doctrine of the pre-New Deal era in full
regalia.,,4o Like the other initial federalism decisions, it merely sought to "make
room for federalism concerns, without at the same time triggering a second
constitutional war over enumerated powers." 41 In Chief Justice Rehnquist' s
hands, even the most expansive post-New Deal cases acknowiedged some
"outer limit" to federal regulatory power, even if it left unclear what that "outer
limit" was. The strength of this opinion was further weakened by a concurring
opinion focused on the need to preserve stability within federalism
jurisprudence and acknowledge the realities of twentieth-century commerce.
Lower courts clearly got the message. While academics and legal
commentators saw a potential revolution in the Court's renewed willingness to
police the scope of the federal government's enumerated powers, federal courts
proved themselves completely uninterested in striking down additional federal
42
laws. Concerns about the scope of Commerce Clause authority prompted
some courts to narrow the scope of federal statutes containing jurisdictional
43
elements, but that was it. Other than the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit,44 no appellate court struck down a federal statute on Conunerce Clause
45
grounds between 1995 and 2000. Moreover, at the same time the Court was
re-establishing modest limits on federal power, other decisions, such as
Term Limits v. Thornton,46 were "profoundly nationalistic.,,47 If the Commerce

u.s.

19

40
41

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
GREVE, supra note 21, at 25.
!d.

42 See Glenn Reynolds & Brannon Denning, Lower Court Readings a/Lopez, or What
if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIse. L.
RFv. 369 (2000); see also Brannon Denning & Glenn Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance:
The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REv.
1253 (2003).
43 See, e. g., United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Carr,
271 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Johnson, 246 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Rea, 300 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Lamont, 330 F.3d 1249 (9th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Ballinger, 312 F.3d 1264 (lIth Cir. 2002).
44 See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic lnst., 169 F.3d 820, 839 (4th Cir. 1999) (en
banc) afJ'd sub nom United States v. Morrison, 52~ U.S . 598 (2000).
45 See Reynolds & Denning, supra note 42, at 369.
46 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
47 NAGEL, supra note 12, at 28 (2001).
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Clause parade was to continue, the Court would have to take another significant
step forward.
II.

BREAK ON THROUGH (TO THE OTHER SlDE)48

While modest in scope, Lopez at least raised the possibility that federal
courts would actively police the boundaries of federal power and stem the
centralization of governmental authority.49 To do so, however, would require
more than a single, tentative decision. The Supreme Court would need to
5o
extend the doctrine in order to entrench it. The "warning shot" would have to
be followed by a "full-out broadside.,,51 Five years after Lopez, the same five
Justice majority appeared to take this step by striking down provisions of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in United States v. Morrison. 52
While most associate the reinvigoration of Commerce Clause scrutiny with
Lopez, Morrisun was the real breakthrough for enumerated powers
jurisprudence. This opinion expressed Commerce Clause doctrine in more
resolute- if not completely unqualified-terms, suggesting the Court' s
majority was serious about the Commerce Clause. Morrison invalidated
provisions of federal law Congress sought to enact explicitly pursuant to the
Commerce Clause power. Unlike in Lopez, there was little sign any justice in
the majority had any hesitation about striking down VA W A's provision
providin?: a civil remedy in federal court for a "crime of violence motivated by
gender." 3 There was no concurrence threatening to narrow the decision's
54
reach.
Doctrinally, Morrison began where Lopez left off. Building on the prior
decision's framework, the Morrison majority identified four factors for courts
to consider in determining whether a given activity "substantially affects"
interstate commerce. First and foremost, is the economic or commercial nature
of the activity in question. Without adopting an ironclad rule, the Court noted
that it had "upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only
where that activity is economic in nature.,,55 Second is whether Congress
included a jurisdictional element in the challenged statute that can serve to

48 THE DOORS, Break on Through (to the Other Side), on THE DOORS (Elektra/Asylum
Records 1967).
49 See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life Ajier
Lopez, 46 CASE W . REs. L. REv. 801 (1996).
50 GREVE, supra note 21, at 45 ("Every application of Lopez . .. will almost surely
extend it.").
51 Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects? 46 VILL.
L. REv. 1325, 1327 (2001) ("the warning shot across Congress' bow in Lopez has been
followed by the full-out broadside of United States v. Morrison").
52 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
53 42 U.S.c. § 13981(d)(I) (2000).
54 Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion in Morrison, but as in Lopez, his
opinion suggested the Court was too timid insofar as it relied upon the "substantial effects"
test at all. See Morrison , 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, 1., concurring).
55 Id. at 613.
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"limit its reach to a discrete set" of actIvItIes that substantially affect
commerce. 56 Such a jurisdictional element does not ensure a statute's
constitutionality,57 but it can provide courts with a basis upon which to construe
58
a statute so as to keep it within constitutional limits. Third is whether
Congress adopted legislative findings regarding the regulated activity's alleged
substantial effect on interstate commerce. 59 As with a jurisdictional element,
the adoption of legislative findings does not ensure a statute's
constitutionality,60 but the adoption of such findings can assist a court in
identifying a given activity's effect on interstate commerce, particularly if the
61
effect is not obvious. The fourth and final factor is the nexus between the
regulated activity and the alleged substantial effect on interstate commerce. Of
particular concern to the Court here is that to accept highly attenuated
connections of this type between intrastate activities and interstate commerce as
the basis for Commerce Clause jurisdiction would make the courts "hard
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate.,,6 If establishing an effect on commerce required piling inference
upon inference--establishing a causal chain that could connect nearly any
conceivable activity to commerce--the statute would not pass muster. 63
While the Court addressed all four factors, it did not stress them equally.
Most of the work in Morrison was performed by the first and fourth factors
whether the regulated activity was itself economic and whether the
hypothesized link between the regulated activity and commerce was so
attenuated as to provide a rationale for regulating anything at all. These two
factors provided the opinion's core, and would ensure that federal power
remained limited. The Court again avoided adopting a categorical rule against
regulating noncommercial intrastate activity. Yet it reiterated that such a
regulation had never been upheld. 64 It further stressed that "the noneconomic,

Id. at 612; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,562 (I995).
See Morrison , 529 U.S. at 612 (noting jurisdictional element "may" establish the
constitutionality of a given statute under the Commerce Clause).
58 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000) ("[W]here a statute is susceptible of
two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by
tbe other of which such questions are avoided" a court's "duty is to adopt the latter.").
59 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
60 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 ("[S]impJy because Congress may conclude that a
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it
so.").
61 See id. at 563.
62 ld. at 564; Mnrrison, 529 U.S . at 613. See also Michell N. Berman, Guillen and
Gullibility: Piercing the SUiface ofCommerce Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. R EV. 1487, 1528
(2004) ("If the Relmquist Court's developing Commerce Clause doctrine is driven by a
single impulse, it is the insistence that the doctrine not amount to a blank check.").
63 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
64 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 ("in those cases where we have sustained federal
regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity'S substantial effects on interstate
commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor"); id. at 613
("Whi le we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any
noneconomic activity .. . thus far in our Nation 's history our cases have upheld Commerce
56
57
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criminal nature uf the conduct at issue" in Lopez was "central" to the
decision.65
As reified in Morrison, the "substantial effects" test is more qualitative
than quantitative. It is more concerned with the nature of the regulated activity
or the regulatory scheme in question than with the aggregate economic impact
of the regulated activity alone, or in combination with other similarly regulated
activities. The key question is whether the activity subject to federal regulation
is itself related to "'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise" or whether
the regulation is "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity
were regulated. ,,66 Congress clearly has the authority to regulate activities that
are "economic in nature,,,67 such as industrial mining68 or loan-sharking.69 It
also may reach relatively minor intrastate activities that are themselves
economic, or related to commercial conduct, through broad economic
regulato~ schemes, such as a price maintenance regime for agricultural
products. 0 But the fact that a given intrastate activity, when aggregated with al\
other instances of like conduct, may have a measurable impact on the nation's
GDP is insufficient. The Court explicitly rejected "the argument that Congress
may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that
conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce.,,71 To hold otherwise would
eviscerate judicial review of congressional exercises of the commerce power
and make "the limitation of congressional authority ... solely a matter of
legislative grace.,,72
If nothing else, Morrison stood for the proposition that the federal
commerce power would be constrained by judicial review. Morrison
demonstrated---or so it appeared-that the Court' s new Commerce Clause
jurisprudence was more than a one-hit wonder. The Court, or at least a slim
majority of the justices, had shown its seriousness at policing federal intrusions
into local concerns. Assuming the lower courts were listening,73 the nation
Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.").
65 Id. at 610.
66 Lopez, 514 U.S . at 561.
67 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608.
68 See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
69 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
70 See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding application of agricultural
production quotas to production for a farmer's own use because allowing such production
would undermine the national price control scheme created by the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 ("Even if appellee's activity be local and though it may
not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether
such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect. '"
(citing Wickard, 31 7 U.S. at 125».
71 Morrison , 529 U.S. at 617.
72 Id. at 616.
73 This assumption was not entirely warranted. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H.
Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters
the Lower Courts, :i5 ARK. L. REv. 1253 (2003).
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would rely upon the judicial safeguards of federalism, rather than the political
safeguards of prior decisions. While federal courts, as a whole, were still
reluctant to invalidate federal statutes on Commerce Clause grounds, some
began to look favorably on as-applied Commerce Clause challenges. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for instance, upheld Commerce Clause
challenges to federal statutes where it found the litigants' conduct was not itself
substantially related to interstate commerce?4 The laws in question were not
invalidated, as occurred in Lopez and Morrison . Rather, in each case the court
held the relevant laws unconstitutional as-applied to particular individuals.
Among the successful litigants were Angel McClary Raich and Diane Monson,
whose successful challenge to the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) would
force the Supreme Court to confront the limits of the Commerce Clause once
. 75
agam.
III. LIGHT MY FlRE

76

Angel Raich and her fellow respondents did not challenge the
constitutionality of the Controlled Substances Act on its face-and with good
reason. There is little basis for challenging the constitutionality of federal
regulation of interstate markets in regulated drugs. Rather, they pressed an as·
applied challenge to the application of the CSA to the "intrastate manufacture
and possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law
exceeds Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.,,77 While this sort of
challenge did not frontally challenge the constitutionality of the Controlled
Substances Act, it presented doctrinal problems of its own.
Raich, like even the most expansive Commerce Clause opinions of the
New Deal era, purported to recognize the continued limits on federal power.
Yet, as with the New Deal opinions, this qualification is overwhelmed by the
force of the doctrinal arguments deployed to uphold the challenged statute.
While recognizing that the most expansive uses of the commerce power should
be confined to economic activities, the majority so expanded the definition of
"economic" so as to leave this a meaningless qualification. While reiterating
the existence of Commerce Clause limits, the majority outlined a commerce
power that is only limited by Congress's appetite for expansive legislation. In
this way the Court, once again, displaced judicial review in favor of the
political safeguards of federalism. Justice Scalia's concurrence, while providing
a more nuanced-and perhaps a more doctrinally satisfying--rationale, was no
74 See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding as-applied
Commerce Clause challenge to application of federal Controlled Substances Act to medical
marijuana) ; Stewart v. United States, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding Commerce
Clause challenge to federal prohibition of possession of fully-automatic weapons as-applied
to home-made firearm); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding
Commerce Clause challenge to federal prohibition on possession of child pornography as
applied to family photo).
75 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
76 THE DOORS, Light My Fire, on THE DOORS (ElektraiAsylum Records 1967).
77 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195,2204-2205 (2005).
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less expansive in its impact. Both the majority and concurring opinions
ho!lowed out Morrison's core-leaving it without any substance, if any life at
all.
On the surface, Justice Stevens's majority opinion may seem consonant
with the principles outlined in Morrison. As an initial matter, the opinion
reiterates that Congress may regulate "purely local activities that are part of an
economic 'class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. ,,78 If the regulated class is "economic," and "it exerts a substantial
effect on interstate commerce," local or seemingly noncommercial activities
within the class remain within federal reach. 79 Yet the Court never really
explains how the activity in question here is "economic" in any meaningful
sense of the word. To the contrary, the Court searches out a relatively elastic
definition of economic, and then stretches it beyond its own discovered
definition.
According to the one dictionary cited by the court, the 1966 Webster's
Third New International Dictionary, "'Economics'" refers to '''the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities. ,,,80 Upon this basis, the Court
declares that the activities at issue in Raich, "[u]nlike those at issue in Lopez
and Morrison," are "quintessentially economic,,81 because those activities
regulated by the CSA are the "production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate
market.,,82 Yet the activity to be regulated here-the activity that is declared by
the court to be "quintessentially economic"-includes the "intrastate
possession" of commodities, and "possession" is not included in the Court's
1966 dictionary. 83
By refusing to exclude noncommercial intrastate possession from the
definition of what constitutes "economic" activity, the majority does more than
refuse to excise de minimis instances from the regulated class. Rather, it refuses
to excise non-commercial activities from a Congressionally defined class
possession of a commodity-that is not, on its own terms, inherently economic.
For the Raich majority, given that the "larger scheme" is economic, it is

/d. at 2205 (citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 151).
Id. at 2206 (quoting Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. Ill, 125 (1942).
80 Id at 2211 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720
(\966» . As Justice Thomas notes, the majority provides no explanation for its reliance on
this particular dictionary, and other dictionaries do not provide quite so expansive a
definition of "economic." Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2236 n.7 (Thomas, 1., dissenting) ("Other
dictionaries do not define the term 'economic' as broadly as the majority does .... The
majority does not explain why it selects a remarkably expansive 40-year-old definition."
(citation omitted». At one level, of course, the question answers itself. The majority cited
this dictionary because it provided the definition that the majority wanted.
8 1 1d.at2211.
82 Id.
78

79

83 This expansive approach to what constitutes "economic" activity is also in conflict
with Lopez. Id. at 2225 (O'Connor, 1., dissenting) ("Lopez makes clear that possession is not
itself a commercial activity.").
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irrelevant that "purely intrastate," non-economic activities are covered. Not
even the infamous case of Wickard v. Filburn,85 upon which Justice Stevens
heavily relies, reached this far. Farmer Filburn was engaged in economic
activity-planting wheat as part of a larger commercial enterprise-even if he
was not engaged in "commerce" with the wheat in question. As deployed by
Justice Stevens, however, the import of Wickard is that Congress may regulate
all possession of an object potentially bought and sold in interstate commerce
Filburn was engaged in the manufacture of goods for interstate commerce.
The statutory scheme at issue controlled wheat production, in part, as a factor
in the production of other goods (e.g. milk, beef) in order to control wheat
prices. In this light, the Court's decision in Wickard could be seen as analogous
to prior decisions in which the Court rejected a distinction between commerce
and manufacture. The Court does not frame the case in this way, however,
stressing instead that Wickard involved the regulation of a "purely intrastate
activity" that was "not itself 'commercial,' in that it is not produced for sale,"
but could nonetheless be regulated if Congress believed a "failure to
regulate . . . would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that
commodity."s6
Morrison, as reinterpreted by Justice Stevens, is fully consonant with this
result, because the statute in question in Raich- the CSA--"is a statute that
directly regulates economic, commercial activity. ,,87 The invalidated VA WA
provision (like the GFSZA) "fell outside Congress' commerce power in its
entirety."ss Thus, so long as a statute largely regulates economic or commercial
activity-or defines a given activity at a level of generality sufficiently broad to
cover a substantial amount of economic activity-there is no limit to the
amount of non-commercial, intrastate activity that may also succumb to federal
89
power so long as Congress enacts a sufficiently expansive regulatory regime.
The Commerce Clause analysis adopted by Justice Stevens provides no
meaningful judicial check on Congressional power. A broad regulatory scheme
that regulates economic matters in some regard will be constitutional in its
entirety.9o If any privately produced item that can substitute for a commercially
produced good is subject to federal control, then Congressional power knows
few limits. A comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing commercial
day care services could justify regulating child care in the home. 91 A
comprehensive regulatory scheme governing pre-packaged frozen dinners
could justify regulating domestic food preparation. A comprehensive regulatory
scheme governing land sales could justify the complete displacement of local

Jd. at 2209.
317 U.S. 111 (J 942) (upholding the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938).
86 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206.
87 Jd. at 221 I.
88 Id. at 2209 (emphasis added).
89 Of note, the majority opinion offers no response to this charge.
90 Vermeule, supra note 51 , at 1332-33.
91 Raich, 125 S. Ct. , at 2225 (O'Connor, 1., di ssenting).
84

85
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zoning. And so on. Only the "political checks that ... generally curb Congress'
power to enact a broad and comprehensive scheme" of regulation would stand
. the way.92
m
These expansive implications of the majority are made clear by the
majority ' s near-absolute deference to what Congress found--4:lr, indeed, might
have found had it looked. For the majority, the relevant question is not whether
medical marijuana use in California actually does have a significant impact on
commerce, but whether Congress could have believed so- even if it made no
specific findings to that effect. 93 So long as an activity is "an essential part of a
larger ... regulatory scheme,,94 then Congress can pretty much define the class
of activities as broadly as it would like. 95 Indeed, the broader the better, as this
will all but ensure the statute's constitutionality. Under Raich the only question
for the Court is whether Congess could have rationally concluded this, not
whether it is actually the case. 6 If Congress adopts legislation controlling non
commercial intrastate activity, so long as there could be a rational basis for
believing that the activity is substantially related to regulated commercial
activity, it should be upheld- even if the Court disagrees. 97
While the majority opinion pays lip service to the idea of judicially
enforceable limits on federal power, there is no evidence that the majority
would ever second-guess Congress's conclusion that controlling non
commercial conduct was necessary to regulate economic activity with which
Congress was concerned. It may still be the case that narrow, largely symbolic
statutes with no relationship to economic activity may exceed the Commerce
Clause, but this is not a meaningful limit on federal power. Such a limit is
dependent upon Congress's own restraint. So long as Congress thinks big- 
"we want the world and we want it, now,,98-the judiciary will not limit the
assertion of federal power. Like the Lizard King, Congress can do anything. 99
In this fashion, the judicial safeguards of federalism are once again replaced
with the political safeguards of federalism.

Id. at 2210 n.34.
While substantial legislative findings accompanied passage of the CSA, none
addressed the medical use of otherwise prohibited substances authorized and regulated under
state law. This should be no surprise, as California and other states did not consider the
regulated legalization of medical marijuana use until decades after adoption of the CSA. Id.
at 2213 n.38 (noting California's law was enacted "34 years after the CSA was enacted").
94 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S . 549,561 (1995).
95 See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2212 ("The congressional judgment that an exemption for
such a significant segment of the total market would undermine the orderly enforcement of
the entire regulatory scheme is entitled to a strong presumptiun of validity.").
96 See id. at 2213 (noting Congress "could have rationally rejected" California's claim
to have separated marijuana used for medical purposes from the broader marijuana market).
97 Indeed, there is no indication in the majority opinion that the rational basis for this
assumption needs to be articulated in the statute itself or legislatiVe history .
98 THE DOORS, When the Music 's Over, on STRANGE:. DAYS (Elektra/Asylum Records
1967).
99 THE DOORS, Not to Touch the Earth, on WAITING FOR THE SUN (Elektra/Asylum
Records 1968) ("I am the Lizard King. I can do anything."). See also DAVIS, supra note 1, at
242.
92
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Concurring in the result Justice Scalia offered a "more nuanced," if no less
1ol
expansive, opinion.
In Scalia's view, the regulation of intrastate activities,
such as Angel Raich's possession and consumption of marijuana for medical
purposes, could not properly be justified as the regulation of "commerce."
Intrastate possession, even of a commodity, is not "commerce." Therefore,
Congress could not reach such activity under the Commerce Clause alone.
Rather, Congress's power to reach such non-economic intrastate activities
"derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause."I02 Rather than adopt an
expansive definition of what constitutes an "economic" activity, Scalia instead
relied upon the Necessary and Proper Clause to reach even those "intrastate
activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce,"
where such regulation is "necessary to make a regulation of interstate
commerce effective."lo3 Scalia wrote separately because "this power ' to
make. . . regulation effective' commonly overlaps with the authority to
regulate economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce," yet
the two powers are "distinct."lo4
The commerce power, by necessity, encompasses the power to "facilitate
interstate commerce by eliminatinltpotential obstructions, and to restrict it by
eliminating potential stimulants." 0 While such actions may not constitute
direct regulation of commerce itself, actions to lubricate or stultify the flow of
goods and services in interstate commerce may be "necessary and proper" to
effectuate Congress' s regulation of commerce. I06 Because marijuana is a
"fungible commodity," congressional power to control interstate drug
trafficking provides sufficient basis to criminalize smoking home-grown
marijuana pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The result in Wickard was
grounded just as much on the "potential disruption" of Congress's efforts to
control wheat prices as it was on any effect personal wheat consumption had on
interstate commerce itself. 107 Indeed, Scalia concurred with the majority's
troubling conclusion that any non-economic intrastate activity is fair game, so
long as such activities are regulated "in connection with a more comprehensive
scheme of regulation."lo8

100 THE DOORS, Five
101

(0

One, on WAITING FOR ruE Sl,;N (ElektraJAsylum Records 1968).

Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring). Cf id. at 2230 (Thomas, J. ,

dissenting) (noting that the application of the Necessary and Proper Clause poses a "more
difficult" question than application of the Commerce Clause itself).
102 !d. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
103 Id. at 2218 (Necessary and Proper Clause "empowers Congress to enact laws in
effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its authority to enact in isolation").
104 !d.at2217.
10' Id. at 2216.
106 Id. at 2217 ("where Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate
commerce, 'it possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.'" (quoting
Unit.:d States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942».
107 Id. at 2217 n.2.
108 Id. at 2218.

IS MORRISON DEAD?

2005J

767

The problem with Scalia's formulation, however, is that the judgment as to
whether the regulation of non-economic activity is necessary to further a
regulation of commerce is left up to Congress, just as it is in Stevens's
majority. In reviewing a federal statute "the relevant question is simply whether
the means chosen are 'reasonabl1c adapted' to the attainment of a legitimate end
under the commerce power." 09 Scalia makes clear that '''all measures
necessary or appropriate to' the effective regulation of the interstate market,,,IIO
as dt:termined by Congress, are allowed. Review of this question is to be quite
deferential as well.
Insofar as limits remain, limits that in Justice Scalia's view would justify
the holdings of Lopez and Morrison, they are to be found in the rejection of
federal authority based solely upon a "remote chain of inferences" connecting a
given non-economic intrastate activity to some effect on interstate
commerce. III Yet Scalia's opinion does not really insulate such activities from
federal regulation. As suggested by the majority, the problem in Lopez was not
that Congress sought to regulate intrastate gun possession, but that Congress
failed to enact a more expansive regulatory statute. Indeed, Scalia as much as
acknowledges that Lopez and Morrison "do not declare noneconomic activities
to be categorically beyond the reach of the federal government.,,112 The
problem in each of those cases was that neither statute regulated non-economic
intrastate activity "in connection with a more comprehensive scheme of
regulation." 11 3 Yet guns, no less than marijuana, are items in interstate
commerce, so had Congress wanted to regulate gun possession in school zones,
a more comprehensive regulatory scheme would have done the trick. I14
Scalia argues that his approach does retain limits on the Commerce
Clause, but it is ultimately unconvincing. Scalia argues that "the power to enact
laws enabling effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be exercised
in conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it
extends onll to those measures necessary to make interstate regulation
effective.,,11 Yet as he acknowledges, so long as Congress could reasonably
conclude that the regulation of a given non-economic intrastate activity is
necessary to maintain a broader regulatory scheme, it passes muster. Thus, as
with the majority opinion, the real limit on Congress's ability to reach non
economic intrastate conduct does not corne from judicial review, but from
potential political opposition to the enactment of the broad regulatory measures

109
110

ld. at 2217 (quoting United Stales v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941».
ld. at 2218 (quoting Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342,353 (1914» (emphasis

added).
III
112

113

Id. at2217.
Id. at2218.
ld.

See id. at 2219-20 n.3 (suggesting the Gun Free School Zones Act could have been
upheld had it been part of a broader fede ral regulatory scheme). As Justice O'Connor
observes, prior to Raich "such arguments have been made only in dissent." ld. at 2223
(O 'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 657 (2000)
(Breyer, 1., dissenting».
J 15 Id. at 2218 (Scalia, 1., concurring).
114
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that would be necessary to reach otherwise non-regulatable activity. If this is
"not a power that threatens to obliterate the line between 'what is truly national
and what is truly local, ",116 this is solely because Congress is unlikely to
regulate so aggressively as to preempt local control of most local activities.
This is a revival of the "political safeguards offederalism" in all but name.
At one level, Scalia's opinion is more doctrinally satisfying as it does not
require the Court to morph the power to regulate "commerce among the states"
into the power to regulate anything that might plausibly relate to such
commerce. Nor does it rely upon an elastic interpretation of what constitutes
economic activity. Yet as elaborated upon by Justice Scalia, this approach to
the Commerce Clause results in an equally expansive interpretation of federal
power, and poses just as mortal a threat to the viability of Morrison. By
Scalia's admission, this is an expansive interpretation of Congress ' s regulatory
authority. In some cases it may even be more expansive than the rationale
. . 117
adopted by the maJonty.
B.

The Changeling I 18

There was little doubt that the four most liberal justices would uphold an
expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause power. Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer made no secret of their distaste for the
heightening of Commerce Clause scrutiny in Lopez and Morrison. Justice
Kennedy, on the other hand, joined the majority in each of those cases, and
stressed the importance of federalism and state autonomy in many other cases
as well." 9 For this reason, Justice Kennedy's silence in Raich was quite
conspicuous, as he appears to have changed his views on the judiciary's
obligation to enforce meaningful limits on federal power.
In Lopez, and elsewhere, Justice Kennedy stressed the importance of state
autonomy. States, he suggested time and again, needed the freedom and
flexibility to develop and implement different approaches to various policy
concerns. While Congress may believe that banning guns in and around schools
is the most efficient and effective way to reduce gun violence in schools,
individual states could well deCide that other policies would be equally
120
effective or better balance competing policy concerns.
While the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency might believe that local air quality is best

fd. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995».
ld. at 2216 (Scalia, 1., concurring) (noting that "the category of ' activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce,' is incomplete because the authority to enact laws
necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws
governing intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce' ) (citation
omitted).
118 THE DOORs, The Changeling, on L.A. WOMAr\ (ElektraJAsylum Record s 1971).
119 See, e.g., Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Cons. v. Envtl. Prot. Agy., 540 U.S. 461, 502
(2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 , 744
(2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). But see U.S. Tenn
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
120 United States v. Lopez, 514 C.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy. J. , concurring).
116
117
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protected through the adoption of particular technologies when facilities are
built or modified, individual states might prefer alternative approaches that
place a greater priority on local economic conditions. 121 Yet if a state believes
that the controlled medical use of marijuana is in the best interest of its citizens,
it is not allowed the flexibility to experiment with such a policy if the federal
government believes that any and all possession and consumption of marijuana
is unacceptable.
Justice Kennedy may have been convinced by the federal government's
argument that allowing medical marijuana in one or more states would threaten
the federal government's control of interstate drug markets and compromise the
general prohibition on the manufacture and distribution of illegal drugs. Yet
states opposed to the legalization of medical marijuana did not share thIs view.
Three states filed an amicus brief to in support of the respondents despite their
opposition to California's policy.!22 Not a single state filed a brief defending
the federal government's position.123 The federal government argued that
excluding any marijuana possession from the CSA, for any purpose, threatened
the viability of national prohibition. Yet Alabama, where drug possession is
prosecuted quite vigorously,124 sought to "support their neighbor's prerogative
in our federalist system to serve as 'laboratories for experimentation. ",125
California's policy may have been "profoundly misguided," yet it posed a
lesser threat to Alabama's sovereignty than a federal commerce power without
effective judicial restraints. Despite Justice Kennedy's prior solicitude for
allowing states to act as laboratories of democracy, he did not respond to such
concerns. 126
One possible explanation for Justice Kennedy's position is that states
should be permitted to engage in policy experiments only in those contexts
where there is little risk. of significant interjurisdictional competition. In Lopez,
Justice Kennedy noted that leaving states free to set their own policies
unleashes a competitive dynamic through which states experiment and compete
to provide the mix of services and amenities desired by present and prospective
127
residents.
This dynamic may not operate in an equivalent fashion across all
policy areas, however. States that adopt unduly burdensome taxes or
regulations risk discouraging business investment or expansion, and even

See Alaska, 540 U.S. at 502 (Kennedy, 1., dissenting).
Brief of the States of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Gonzales v. Raich, 2004 WL 2336486 (hereinafter Alabama Brief).
Louisiana, while a party to the brief, does allow the medicinal use of marijuana in very
limited circumstances. See id. at n.5.
123 This is potentially significant because, in other federalism cases, many states filed
briefs supporting the constitutionality of a broad Commerce Clause power.
124 See Ethan Nadelmann, An End to Marijuana Prohibition, NATl. REv. (July 12,
2004), at 28 ("Alabama currently locks up people convicted three times of marijuana
possession for 15 years to life.").
125 Alabama Brief, supra note 122, at 2-3.
126 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195,2221 (2005) (Connor, J., dissenting) ("This
case exemplifies the role of States as laboratories. ").
127 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 -583 (1995) (Kennedy, 1., concurring).
121
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driving taxpayers to more hospitable jurisdictions. Criminal laws, like those
aimed at suppressing school violence or gender-motivated crimes, "cut[] the
opposite way.,,128 Whereas states may benefit from reducing taxes or easing
regulations, they benefit from increasing, not decreasing, the stringency of
criminal laws. 129 Allowing states to experiment with different approaches to
controlling drug abuse, it seems, risks some states adopting policies that are
insufficiently stringent, as California and several other states elected to
decriminalize medical marijuana possession. This sort of interjurisdictional
competition--the sort that results in true policy diversity-is foreclosed by
Raich. Yet to only allow states to experiment where the policy outcome is
certain is to forego the benefits of state experimentation in the first place. 130
It is also possible that Justice Kennedy is convinced that any federal effort
to control the national market in a commodity or service is constitutional,
insofar as the emergence of a "single national market" is what led to the
131
expansion of the federal commerce power in the first place.
Other
commentators have been less charitable in their initial assessments, suggesting
that Justice Kennedy may have views about drug use that eclipse his concerns
about the traditional federal state balance.132 Whatever the reason for his vote,
Justice Kennedy offered no explanation as to how the Raich holding comported
with federalism principles he endorsed in prior opinions. In Raich, we saw a
once-reliable vote for a judicially enforced federalism change into a defender of
federal power.
IV. I CAN'T SEE YOUR FACE 133
One additional wrinkle in Raich was the respondent's effort to mount an
as-applied Commerce Clause challenge. Raich did not maintain that the CSA
as a whole, or even any of its provisions, was unconstitutional and should be
struck down . 134 Rather, she maintained that the CSA was only unconstitutional
as-applied to the specific conduct at issue. This was potentially significant
because, up until this point, the only successful Commerce Clause challenges

Epstein, supra note 37, at 180.
GREVE, supra note 2l, at 32.
110 Id. at 82 ("a Court that celebrates state government only when and where the states
will surely regulate ... will soon forget that federalism's point is to discipline state
governments, not to empower them. " ).
131 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568, 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Congress can regulate in
the commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose
to build a stable national economy. ").
132 See Lyle Denniston, Commentary: Justice Kennedy and the "War on Drugs ",
SCOTUSBLOG, June 6, 2005 ("Kennedy, it has been clear for some time, has little tolerance,
judicial or otherwise, for those who are users of drugs, or who resist drug control
measures.") available at http://www.scotusblog.com!movabletype/archives/2005/06/
commentaryjust.htm!.
133 THE DOORS, I Can't See Your Face, on STRANGE DAYS (Elektra/Asylum Records
1967).
134 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195,2230 (2005) (Connor, J., dissenting).
128

129
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were facial challenges. While some litigants in prior cases had sought to make
as-applied challenges to federal statutes, such claims were rejected by the
Supreme Court every time they were brought. 135 If there was such a thing as an
as-applied Commerce Clause challenge, there was little indication in the U.S.
Reports what it might look like, and how it should be framed.
Facial challenges are rather straightforward. When a litigant challenges the
constitutionality of a statute "on its face," she argues that the statute is invalid
irrespective of its application. For such a challenge to be successful, the litigant
must demonstrate that "no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid .,,136 As the Supreme Court explained in United States v.
Salerno , this makes a facial challenge "the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully" against a federal statute. 137
As a reneral rule, courts disfavor facial constitutional challenges to federal
statutes. 13 Rather, the typical constitutional challenge alleges that a given
statute is unconstitutional as-applied to a particular litigant or particular
situation. 139 A successful as-applied challenge does not strike down the statute
in question. It merely bars the government from applying that statute to the
situation at hand. After a successful as-applied challenge, the government
remains free to apply the statute in other contexts. The fact that the statute
might be unconstitutional as-applied to certain circumstances has no impact on
the law's overall validity.14o Outside of the First Amendment context, a law
will not be struck down on "overbreadth" grounds because it "might operate
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances.,,141
While the Court did not pause to declare the type of challenge at issue in
either Lopez or Morrison, it is fairly clear that the Court upheld facial

135 Nathaniel S. Stewart, Note, Turning the Commerce Clause "On Its Face ": Why
Federal Commerce Clause Statutes Demand Facial Challenges, 55 CASE WES. L. REv. 161

(2004). As Stewart details:
[T]he Supreme Court has invariably abstained from invalidating Commerce Clause
starutes on an as-applied basis. That is, the Court has engaged in the facial analysis of
determining whether the class of activity at issue is a constitutionally regulable class,
and then whether the petitioner was a member of that class.
Jd. at 196.
136 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
137 /d.
138 A court "should not extend its invalidation of a statute further than necessary to
dispose of the case before it." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. 472 U.S. 491, 502 (1985) .
See also United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20-22 (1960) (as-applied challenges are
preferred to facial challenges).
139 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. , As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party
Standing, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1321 , 1321 (2000) ("the normal if not exclusive mode of
constitutional adjudication involves an as-applied challenge"). Indeed, Professor Fallon goes
further, positing that "[a]l! challenges to statutes arise when a litigant claims that a statute
cannot be enforced against her." Jd.
140 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 ("The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate
unconstitutionally under conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly
invalid ...").
141 Jd.
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142
challenges to the respective statutes in each case.
In neither case did the
Court consider whether the specific conduct at issue-Alfonso Lopez's
possession of a gun in school or two Virginia Tech football players' alleged
brutal rape of another student- was substantially related to interstate
commerce. Rather, the Court considered the laws themselves, striking them
down because the relevant provisions lacked the necessary attachment to
interstate commerce. In doing so, the Court necessarily held that in each case
"no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be vaJid.,,143
Had the Court only considered an as-applied challenge in either case, the
result might have been different, particularly in Lopez. Alfonso Lopez had
brought the r;n to school as a courier in order to complete a commercial
transaction. 14 His possession in this particular case was commercial. 145 On this
basis, the Court could have readily aggregated Lopez's gun possession in a
school zone with all other instances of commercial gun possession in school
zones- that is, all the other instances in which someone brought a gun into a
school zone for the purpose of furthering a commercial transaction- and
upheld the law as-applied to Lopez. After a1l, the de minimis nature of the
activity is irrelevant if it may be aggregated with other like instances. As an as
appJied challenge, Lopez would be virtually indistinguishable from cases like
Perez v. United States, in which the Court upheld the federal regulation of a
small-time local loan shark. 146
The Court did not uphold the GFSZA as-applied to Lopez, however.
Rather, it struck down the statute because the regulated activity-gun
possession in a school zone-was not economic. As the Court noted, the
GFSZA "by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of
economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms"; 147 this
was true regardless of whether Lopez possessed the gun for commercial
purposes. It had no more than an attenuated connection to interstate commerce
and could not be aggregated to sustain the law. Indeed, the fact that Lopez was
engaged in a commercial transaction was not even mentioned in any of the
148
justices' opinions. As emphasized in Morrison, the regulated conduct-gun

142 See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 610 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part) (noting that in Lopez and Morrison, the Court resolved "the basic question whether
Congress, in enacting the statutes challenged there, had exceeded its legislative power under
the Constitution") (emphasis added); Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("The Court in
those cases upheld facial Commerce Clause challenges to legislation prohibiting the
possession of firearms in school zones and violence against women.").
143 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S 739, 745 (1987).
144 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3 d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993).
145 For instance, had the federal government banned gun possession for the purpose of
engaging in black market firearms transactions, gun sales to minors, or some other
commercially related activity.
146 402 U.S. 146, 146-47 (1971).
147 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).
148 Rancho Viejo, L.L.c. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 2003), reh 'g en
banc denied, 334 F.3d 1158 (2003) (noting "the Supreme Court attached no significance to"
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possession in a school zone- was nOl commercial in character. 149 This was true
regardless of the commercial nature of Alfonso Lopez's specific conduct.
The problem in each case was that the class of activities that Congress
sought to regulate was beyond the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause
authority, even though it was conceivable that either statute could be applied to
specific conduct that was commercial in character. Had the statutes been
written differently- perhaps including jurisdictional elements that would have
confined each statute's reach to those activities sufficiently connected to
commcrce to lay within the scope of federal power l50-the results would
almost certainly have been different. Rather than confront the constitutionality
of each statute as a whole, the Court would have considered whether, given the
facts of each specific case, a sufficient commercial connection was
demonstrated to satisfy the requirements of the law. In Jones v. United States,
for example, a unanimous court interpreted a federal statute prohibiting arson
of any "property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity
affecting interstate or foreign commerce,,151 to cover "onlr property currently
used in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce." 5 By its terms, the
statute only reached those activities within Congress's Commerce Clause
authority, so there would be no means to challenge the law as-applied. So long
as CO:1gress can prohibit arsons that are sufficiently connected to commerce,
there is no constitutional problem with applying the statute to any given
conduct that is itself sufficiently connected to commerce.
As noted above, the Supreme Court never ruled favorably on an as-applied
Commerce Clause challenge. More important for understanding the obstacles
confronting tht respondents in Raich, the analysis consistently adopted by the
Court in Commerce Clause cases would seem to preclude the possibility of an
as-applied challenge. As the Court noted in Maryland v. Wirtz, "[t]he only
question for the courts is then whether the class is 'within the reach of the
federal power. ",1 53 And in every Commerce Clause case in the last six decades,
154
the class has been defined by the terms of the statute adopted by Congress.
Thus, if a given litigant's conduct is within the statutorily defined class-and
regulation of the class as a whole is constitutional (or part of a broader,
constitutional regulatory scheme)-the challenge will necessarily fail.
This is as true in the "New Federalism" cases as it was in the New Deal.
For the Court to do what it did in Lopez and Morrison, it had to define the class

Lopez's participation in a commercial transaction).
149 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000).
150 For instance, the law could have been rewritten to require that the possession be
with the intent to engage in a commercial transaction.
151 18 U. S.C. § 844(i) (2000).
152 529 U.S . 848, 859 (2000).
153 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,192 (1968) (quoting United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100,120- 21 (1941) (emphasis added).
154 From this perspective, one can argue that the proper Commerce Clause challenge to
a federal statute is, in fact. a facial challenge. This case is made at length in Stewart, supra
note 135 .
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based upon the conduct identified by Congress as the subject of the regulation.
If a statute prohibits "possession of a firearm in a school zone" or "filling a
jurisdictional wetland without a permit," then that is how the class of activities
is defined for the purposes of a Commerce Clause challenge. 155 If the statute
also lacks a jurisdictional element, the question is not whether the specific
conduct engaged in by a litigant affects commerce, either in isolation or in
combination with all other like conduct. Rather, it is whether the conduct
identified by Congress substantially affects commerce. If so, the statute is
constitutional, and the only question is whether the litigant's conduct fall s
within the statute. 156
Under existing precedents, for an as-applied challenge to be viable there
needs to be an alternative means of defining the relevant class. Prior to Raich,
none of the Court's opinions suggested how this could be done . The Court has
noted that "depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked
upon as commercial.,,1 57 Because de minimis instances of a regulable class are
not excluded from Congress's reach, the Court was required to adopt a
qualitative approach to determining what activities substantially affect
l58
commerce. Yet it has still focused on the class as defined by Congress so as
to avoid a potentially standard less and indeterminate inquiry into how a given
regulated activity should be classified and characterized.
The reason why as-applied challenges are nonetheless appealing is because
requiring facial challenges has the potential to be very strong medicine.159
Where federal statutes lack jurisdictional elements, or other provisions that
would enable courts to excise a given litigant's conduct from the statute's
reach , the only way a court can rule favorably on a Commerce Clause challenge
is to strike the statute down. In the case of a broad regulatory statute, such as
the Controlled Substances Act, the lack of as-applied challenges presents courts
with a dilemma: Invalidate the statute or allow Congress to re~ulate classes of
activities that lack a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 60

155 See, e.g., GDF Realty Invs. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 633 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting
"the scope of the inquiry is primarily whether the expressly regulated activity substantially
affects interstate commerce").
156 As a practical matter, these issues are likely to be addressed in the opposite order so
as to avoid the premature consideration of constitutional questions. That is, the Court will
first determine whether the conduct in question falls within the scope of the statute. Only
after answering this question affirmatively will a court then proceed to considering the
statute ' s constitutionality.
157 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995).
158 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968) (Courts lack th e power "to excise, as
trivial , individual instances falling within a rationally defined class of activities.").
159 See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998) (" Facial
invalidation ' is, manifestly, strong medicine' that ' has been employed by the Court sparingly
and only as a last resort. " , (citation omitted».
160 Under the general assumption that statutory provisions will be severable, the court
would not have to strike down the statute in its entirety, but it would have to invalidate a
given statutory provision.
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A good example is the Endangered Species Act (ESA).161 Under section 9
of the ESA, it is unlawful to "take" a species listed as "endangered" under the
act. 162 The ESA defines "take" to include just about any activity that could kill,
injure, or harm a listed species, including the modification of habitat on private
land. 163 While the law clearly covers many commercial activities, such as
paving over habitat to build a parking lot or strip mall, as well as economically
motivated behavior, such as hunting endangered animals to sell their feathers or
fur, by its terms the ESA is not confined to conduct that is substantially related
to commerce. While it may be the case that the vast majority of activity
regulated under the ESA would still be regulated were the statute to contain a
jurisdictional element limiting its application to commercially related activities,
such a provision is lacking. For this reason, it is not immediately clear why the
taking of a species on private land is all that different from carrying a gun to
school. Each activity may be related to commerce in any given instance, but a
statute prohibiting either does not define a commercially related class. That is
to say, whether a given individual's conduct is covered by the statute has
nothing to do with whether her conduct substantially affects commerce. All that
matters is the "take" of a listed species. Shooting an endangered owl out of
spite is just as illegal as bulldozing Delhi Sands Flower-loving fly habitat for
commercial development. A teenager's spiteful use of a slingshot can be just as
criminal as a developer's profit-seeking use of land movers. Without an as
applied challenge, the federal government's authority to regulate both activities
will rise or fall together.
Faced with this dilemma, appellate courts have struggled to come up with
coherent rationales for sustaining the ESA against Commerce Clause
challenges. '64 In the cases to date, three divided appellate courts have upheld
the ESA as against Commerce Clause challenge. 165 Appellate judges are
understandably reluctant to invalidate a far-reaching environmental statute
intended to protect thousands of different species from extinction. 166 After
Morrison they are also not to uphold federal statutes on a basis that effectively

16 U.S.C'. §§ 1531 - 44 (2000).
16 U.S.c. § 1538(a)(I) (2000).
163 16 U.S.c. § 1532(19) (2000) (defining to "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct"). See
also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. , 515 U.S. 687, 690 (1995) (upholding
definition of "take" to include "significant habitat modification or degradation" that
"actually kills or injures wildlife").
164 This issue is addressed in greater depth in Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism
and the Future ofFederal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REv. 377,406-17 (2005).
165 See Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 2003), reh 'g en
banc denied, 334 F.3d 1158 (2003); GDF Realty Invs. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 624 (5th Cir.
2003); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 FJd 483, 487 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v.
Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D .C. Cir. 1997).
166 Appellate judges are reluctant to strike down such a well-intentioned statute even if
it does not clearly protect endangered species. See Adler, supra note 164, at 459-60
(summarizing arguments that the Endangered Species Act is not effective at conserving
species).
161

162
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creates an unlimited federal regulatory power. Yet lacking the means to rule on
an as-applied challenge, they must choose one or the other.
Like prior courts, the Raich majority dealt with this issue by treating the
as-applied challenge as if it were a facial challenge. 167 The Court acknowledged
that the challenge was as-applied, but the Court did not conduct an as-applied
analysis. Although the Court uses the phrase "as applied" several times
throughout the decision, there is really no as-applied analysis. Insofar as the
Court holds that minor, intrastate, non-economic activities may be regulated as
part of a broader regulatory scheme, there is no set of facts to which an
otherwise valid law would be unconstitutional "as-applied."
Given that the CSA itself is a constitutional regulation of economic
activity, the Court saw no basis upon which it could carve out the conduct at
issue from the overall regulatory scheme. Indeed, the Court fully deferred to
Congress's judgment that the class of activities regulated by the CSA was a
single, undifferentiated class for the purposes of Commerce Clause
challenges. 168 Given Congress' s apparent, albeit now wholly articulated,
judgment, the Court dismissed efforts by the respondents and the dissenters to
differentiate the noncommercial intrastate possession of marijuana for medical
purposes pursuant to state law from commercially related possession.
This treatment of an as-applied challenge was not an innovation in Raich.
To the contrary, the Court's refusal "to excise individual components of that
larger scheme" has been the norm-a norm to which there have been no
exceptions. 169 After Raich, this pattern will continue. Because an "as-applied"
challenge is only a challenge to a federal statute as-applied to a given
class-and because the Court holds that Congress may regulate any class of
activities that are plausibly connected to commerce so long as the regulation is
part of a broader regulatory scheme-there is no potential for a successful as
applied challenge under Raich. When Morrison died, the prospect for as
applied Commerce Clause challenges expired as well.
V. WHEN THE MUSIC ' S OVER

I7o

When Jim Morrison's body was discovered lying in a bathtub in a Paris
flat, some doubted he was really dead. l7l There were rumors he had died

167 There are cases in which the Court appeared to consider as-applied challenges to
federal statutes. See, e. g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). A careful reading of the Court's analyses in
these cases, however, reveals that the Court actually engaged in facial review of the statutes
at issue. See Stewart, supra note 135, at 191-92.
168 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206 ("We have never required Congress to legislate wilh
scientific exactitude. When Congress decides that the ''' total incidence '" of a practice poses
a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.").
169 ld. at 2209 ("As we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual
components of a larger regulatory scheme.").
170 THE DOORS, Wh en the Music's Over, on STRANGE DAYS (Elektra/Asylum Records
1967).
I- I
, DAVIS. supra note I, at 466.
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before,172 and to this day some maintain his death was staged. 173 But there is
little doubt his life ended that sad day in France, ending a brief yet brilliant
musical career. 174
The death of United States v. Morrison is equally hard to deny. Insofar as
Morrison validated and fortified the holding of United States v. Lopez, its work
has been undone. While it is possible to distinguish Raich, and argue the CSA
is materially different from many other federal regulatory statutes, courts are
unlikely to take this step any time soon. 175 Without the possibility of as-applied
Commerce Clause challenges, such opportunities are unlikely to arise. Federal
appellate courts were already reluctant to curtail federal power on Commerce
Clause grounds. They will be even more timid after the Court's rejection of
early experiments at isolating distinct non-commercial activity from broader
regulatory schemes.
In another sense, Morrison will live on. Like Lopez, it will be cited in
subsequent cases for the generic proposition that federal power is limited.
Morrison's formulation of the relevant considerations in evaluating Commerce
Clause challenges will be repeated, but they will not retain any meaningful
doctrinal force. Congress may not be able to enact stand-alone, symbolic
legislation, but it will face no meaningful judicial obstacles to the assertion of
far-reaching regulatory authority. Insofar as the judicial safeguards of limited
and enumerated powers survive, they are a pale echo of what they might have
been.
Jim Morrison's music lives on without him. Vigorous sales of
posthumously released records and demos, videos of live performances, and
other memorabilia continue to this day.176 There was even a VH -1 special and a
Doors reunion tour performing music Morrison himself never sang before a
live aUdience. 177 Yet even the most talented replacement does not have the
vitality of the real thing. It is a pale echo and, for some, a painful memory of
what might have been.

172 Jd. at 245 (United Press International erroneously reported Morrison's death in
March 1968).
173 Jd. at 467 (noting one Morrison biography suggests Morrison "might have faked his
own death").
174 Jim Morrison died only five years after The Doors signed their recording deal with
Elektra Records. By comparison, Raich was handed down only five years after Morrison .
175 Ray Manzarek and Robby Krieger did not tour as The Doors of the 21 st Century
until over thirty years after Morrison's death.
176 See, e.g., THE DOORS, IN CONCERT (ElektralAsylum Records 1991); THE DOORS,
THE BEST OF THE DOORS (ElektralAsylum Records 1985); JIM MORRISON, Al\ AMERICA)\;
PMYER (ElektralAsy lum Records 1978). See also http://www.thedoors.com.
177 Jim Morrison died before The Doors toured in support of the L.A. Woman album.
See also "Riders on the Storm," at http: //www.thedoors.comlbandl?fa=21stc.
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This is the end, beautiful friend
This is the end, my only friend
The end ofour elaborate plans
The end of everythin~ that stands
The end.' 8

178

THE DOORS, The End, on THE DOORS (ElektraJAsylum 1967).
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